Free Will (2012)
Sam Harris (1967)
83 pages
Sorting through the debate about whether humans have free will requires us to confront the potentially misleading influence of our natural predispositions. Our intuition and – superficially, at least – our day-to-day experience make it seem almost self-evident that we do have free will, with even the language we use to describe our thoughts and actions powerfully reinforcing that belief. All of this can bias any attempt to consider the contrary position.Neuroscientist and philosopher Sam Harris works through these challenges in his essay Free Will. Arguing that free will is an illusion, he describes what has led him to that conclusion, discusses how those who argue in support of the presence free will get it wrong in his opinion, and concludes by exploring why the debate is not simply an esoteric enterprise but should directly impact our view of ourselves and others, and more generally how we structure aspects of our society.
From readings and other sources, I have for some time accepted the view that we do not have free will. Recently, however, I listened to an engaging interview on Sean Carroll's Mindscape podcast with the philosopher Christian List, in which the two energetically advocate for its existence. Although I found their arguments decidedly unconvincing (as I discuss here), it became clear to me that, if asked, I couldn't provide adequate or coherent counter-arguments. As a step toward rectifying that, I picked up Harris’s book, having heard him occasionally discuss the topic on his Making Sense podcast.
I ended up reading through his essay twice – easy enough to do at 83 pages – in part because the first pass actually left me questioning my position of free will being an illusion! Not fundamentally, to be clear, but in the sense of whether there could be some intermediate understanding in which free will can be considered to exist – whether it is perhaps more a question of how one defines it But, as I worked through the second reading, I found myself coming back to my original position: free will is an illusion.
On the first pass through, I was struck by Harris’s description, early in the essay, of how those who believe in free will define it:
The popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present.
In the very next sentence, he gets to his punchline, declaring that “As we are about to see... both of these assumptions are false.” (6) A decisive verdict, but his description of the “popular conception of free will” struck me as perhaps defining a too easy to debunk strawman position. Although there may not be any definition that would satisfy Harris as a defensible argument for the presence of free will, this set of assumptions against which he builds his counter-arguments feels too extreme.
He dismisses the first assumption based on the deterministic nature of the physics that govern our universe, arguing that “No one has ever described a way in which mental and physical processes could arise that would attest to the existence of such freedom.” (6) (He appropriately discounts quantum effects or other low-level randomness – as does Carroll in the podcast interview – as not providing free will in any applicable definition of the term.) To make it concrete: the idea that, if one could rewind the universe into precisely the state it was at the moment we made some decision, that we then might then somehow be free to make some other decision at that same moment seems indefensible. (List makes what feels like a mixture of quasi-physics and hand-waving arguments for “different levels of description at which we can think about the world… a physical level … and a [higher] level of agency [which] opens up new space for defending free will” (0:12:40, podcast link above) to get around this – but, again, I found it unconvincing.)
It could certainly be argued that, if at that same past moment, we had more or other information the second time around, or some of myriad different conditions – in our environment or within ourselves – were changed, then we may have reached a different decision. But, if literally everything is equal, it makes no sense to somehow believe that a different decision could be made – short of believing in some sort of magical cognition that transcends physical laws, constitutes our true self, and controls our thoughts.
Ultimately, however, it’s not clear that such an assumption about past behavior is really the main point. It would seem more significant for free will that in any present moment we can freely and consciously decide on our thoughts and actions.
And it was specifically this second assumption in Harris’s definition of the popular conception of free will that tripped me up a bit. At first blush, it appears obvious that we can't have free will if we are not “the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions.” But, as I read through his arguments, I began to wonder if the qualifier “most” was building a strawman, taking an extreme case. Could one consider, instead, a level of free will that allows a more expansive place for the subconscious as a “source … of our thoughts and actions”? If the subconscious is significantly involved, but the conscious mind does some level of final arbitration – particularly if we take the conscious mind as to some extent aware of subconscious influence – could one consider this a form of free will? Reading through the essay a second time, however, it becomes clear that Harris marshals research results and experimental evidence demonstrating the full extent to which our thoughts arise largely out of and are significantly influenced by our subconscious, thereby dismissing also this second assumption, whether one includes the qualifier “most” or not.
Harris addresses this directly in discounting a less strict definition of free will than he opens the essay with, quoting a philosopher who wrote
[I] understand free will as a set of capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one's reasons for choosing them, planning one's actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires [which] we... exercise... without unreasonable external or internal pressure. (41)
While Harris acknowledges both that humans have such capacities and that they are an important part of what it means to be human, he argues that the level to which our subconscious (invisibly) influences such “deliberation and controlling actions” means that simply having these capabilities does not imply (or require) the existence of free will.
In light of his view of free will as an illusion, Harris concludes the essay by exploring its implications for individuals and society. In particular, he argues that it makes no sense to hold ourselves, or others, morally culpable for what we do. If physical determinism strictly drives our thoughts and actions and if our subconscious deeply influences our conscious thoughts and actions, then we could not have consciously (freely) thought or acted otherwise than we did in any given moment.
This has direct consequences, he finds, for how society should respond to criminal behavior; someone who commits a crime, acts based on the influence of their subconscious and so it makes no sense to punish them for their actions. Instead of exacting punitive retribution, an understanding of the lack of free will warrants instead pursuing rehabilitation or, at least, focusing incarceration on the goal of protecting society from those whose crimes make them dangerous. Making a parallel to an easier case, Harris points out that most people would feel differently about a criminal who one learns has some sort of tumor or other physical malady impacting their behavior; this generalizes, he argues, to the hidden, complex mix of genetics and environment and experiences that form our subconscious and thereby heavily influence our behavior.
That said, he argues that the lack of moral accountability does not mean people should become fatalistic: “A creative change of input to the system – learning new skills, forming new relationships, adapting new habits of attention – may radically transform one’s life.” (46) The challenge remains, of course, that one cannot choose such a path (in the absence of free will), which is where the language in discussing free will as an illusion again becomes tricky. Harris nods toward this semantic dilemma in noting that:
Getting behind our conscious thoughts and feelings can allow us to steer a more intelligent course through our lives (while knowing, of course, that we are ultimately being steered). (47, my italics)
In his essay Free Will, Harris puts forth his belief that we do not have it, presenting results from a variety of scientific studies that support this conclusion before going on to discuss its implications for individuals and for society. But the difficulty for each of us remains: how to overcome the powerful, overwhelming feeling that we do have it and so become open to considering the alternative. In that vein, he concludes by issuing a kind of personal challenge, arguing that if we examine our own personal experience more deeply, we will come to the same conclusion that the science, for him, indicates.
It is not that free will is simply an illusion – our experience is not merely delivering a distorted view of reality. Rather, we are mistaken about our experience. Not only are we not as free as we think we are – we do not feel as free as we think we do Our sense of our own freedom results from our not paying close attention to what it is like to be us. The moment we pay attention, it is possible to see that free will is nowhere to be found, and our experience is perfectly compatible with this truth. Thoughts and intentions simply arise in the mind. (64)
The scientific studies, he seems to say, can reinforce the conclusion, but the reality of the answer to the question of free will lies within each of us to find, if we are willing to explore our experience more deeply.
Other notes and information:
Regarding the conclusion that we should be less judgmental: one can, of course, make such an argument that is not based on free will being an illusion. In that vein, nature writer Barry Lopez noted
the perplexing question posed by [rafting through the heart of the Grand Canyon] – What is consequential? (in one’s life, in the life of human beings, in the life of a planet) – that reverberate[s] constantly, and make[s] the human inclination to judge (another person, another kind of thought) seem so eerie. (47, Crossing Open Ground)
Have you read this book, others by this author, or even similar ones by other authors? I’d enjoy hearing your thoughts.
Other of my book reviews: FICTION Bookshelf and NON-FICTION Bookshelf

















