The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (1985)
Nathaniel Davis (1925-2011)
480 pages
In September 1973, the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, died during a military coup. He and his government were replaced by a ruling junta led by General Augusto Pinochet.
Beyond these indisputable facts, however, the history of the coup quickly became mired in controversy, as already in its immediate aftermath conflicting claims and accusations dominated the discussion. The clandestine planning and often-chaotic execution of coup attempts can complicate getting to the truth in such situations, of course. But, in addition, the publicly visible animosity of the United States to Allende and his policies – among conservative politicians, and corporate executives with economic interests in Chile – bred a myriad of suspicions about US involvement.
With Cold War tensions running high and the US government having repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to aggressively contest the spread of communism, it is perhaps not surprising that a belief arose that the United States played a direct and material role in the overthrow of Allende’s government. The questions raised were in fact sufficient to trigger a US Congressional investigation. Although that inquiry found no conclusive evidence of US involvement, the idea that US agencies in some way actively conspired to bring about the coup nonetheless became the dominant narrative of events in Chile, not just on the left, but also in the political center, both within the US and globally.
Nathaniel Davis, the US ambassador to Chile during the last two years of Allende’s government, begs to differ with that deeply entrenched understanding of the Chilean coup, however. In his book The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, Davis claims that the US government actually avoided giving any implication of support to groups potentially working to overthrow the Chilean government, and that the coup in fact erupted largely out of the social, political, and economic conditions particular to Chile at that time.
Davis began his ambassadorship in Chile roughly a year after the September 1970 elections that lifted Allende to power, and he presents his case based on his vantage point at the heart of events, as well as his later discussions with relevant colleagues within the US government. In the opening chapter Davis summarizes the first year of Allende’s presidency, before then beginning his recounting in earnest with his own arrival on the scene, which, he argues, coincided with a moment when “the Allende government reached a turning point … both in the political and the economic sense.” (xiii) The bulk of the book, then, covers the two years from Davis’s arrival to the moment of the coup and its immediate aftermath.
Davis tells the story roughly chronologically, with chapters developed around critical moments in the mounting turmoil. In the final part of the book, he explores in detail controversial aspects of the conventional narrative of events in Chile during this period, including what role the US government played, and whether Allende was murdered or committed suicide on the day of the coup.
Broadly, Davis argues that US engagement during the Allende presidency was focused mainly on maintaining “institutional democracy in Chile” (398), by providing support for opposition political parties and organizations on the center and right, so they could continue to act as viable counterweights to Allende and those on the Chilean left who aggressively sought to curtail their activities. He claims that during his period as ambassador he was meticulous about the US delegation in Chile not providing even the appearance of support for the idea of overthrowing the Allende government. He further states that he has found no indication of any support being given to the coup organizers from other elements of the US government, based on the results of the investigations that occurred in the US Congress after the coup and on his discussions with key figures in the State Department, the CIA and others within the US government, as well as within the ruling junta in Chile.
Davis contends that the coup in fact needed no impetus from the US, that it grew organically out of the increasing political and economic chaos that gripped Chile as the Allende government and associated leftist groups pursued a shift toward a socialist state. The Chilean government’s actions led to opposition from not only right-wing nationalists, but increasingly those in the middle class and political center, with the country disrupted by repeated strikes that spread from truck drivers to a wide variety of other commercial organizations and even professionals. Ultimately, Davis concludes that Allende’s vacillation during this period – wanting to achieve the transition to socialism without violence but unable or unwilling to “impose discipline on his own coalition” (405) as they engaged in ever more militant actions – fatally undermined his presidency.
Building on both his firsthand knowledge and his conversations with high-ranking sources, Davis develops a careful and thorough history of the final two years of Allende’s government, making a convincing case that US involvement, if not completely innocent, did not materially support the coup, and further that Allende died by suicide. Nonetheless, he faces a difficult dilemma throughout the text, one highlighted by a comment he makes at one point, referring specifically to the previous few pages of the book but that could be applied to the book as a whole: “The preceding pages may have the flavor of personal apologia.” (330) He recognizes that many, if not most, readers will come to his book with the deeply held conviction that the US was in some way involved in the instigation and prosecution of the coup, and that this belief means that every claim of innocence and non-involvement that Davis makes for himself, and for the US government more generally, will be met with, if not outright skepticism, then at least the shadow of doubt.
And it’s easy to understand why. Unless a reader is inalterably convinced about what happened in Chile in the early 1970s (US-led coup or not), it can be difficult to read Davis’s account without feeling oneself caught in a kind of hall of mirrors: his narrative and conclusions seem logical and persuasive, but at every step one wonders if one is being misled by misdirection, or careful selection of the facts. Davis himself acknowledges this dilemma at one point with a trenchant quote (that applies all too well to present-day conspiracy theorists in the US as well):
As Flora Lewis of the New York Times has commented, “everything that comes out [about US government actions] makes skepticism look nearer the mark on public affairs these days than credence, though there is also the danger of what David Reisman wisely calls ‘the gullibility of the cynical.’ (307)
It could in fact be argued that Davis somewhat undermines his own case, in that sense, with his pointed decision to focus tightly on the two-year period he spent as US ambassador in Chile. Although he presents convincing arguments about the limited US involvement in Chile during that time, by limiting himself to just the short period of his involvement – even if that was admittedly the critical moment – he tends to imply a rather benign picture of US global engagement more broadly. And much as one can argue that the US has been a force for good in the world, as Flora Lewis noted in her article linked to above, and as can be understood from a variety of other sources, the US government has often enough in its history aggressively intervened in countries to get its way, including directly resorting to armed intervention. Such engagements occurred repeatedly in the twentieth century in the Western Hemisphere alone, including in Chile in support of Pinochet in the years after Davis had left for other shores.
Such activities in fact impacted Davis himself, just two years after he left Chile: he reports having been eased into a low visibility role in the State Department – transferred to a post in Switzerland – after “Secretary [Henry] Kissinger and I had come to disagree profoundly on covert US intervention in Angola.” (387) One can take this as supporting Davis’s credibility, while still leaving room to wonder what he might not have been in the loop about what was happening in Chile.
Toward the end of his book, Davis highlights an important, more global, consequence of the dominant narrative implicating the US in the coup: it obscured the lessons of the coup for those on the left. Belief that the US aggressively tipped the scales in Chile led communists and socialists elsewhere to ignore the critical economic, social and political problems that Davis argues profoundly undermined Allende’s government and goals. Rather than coming to grips with the true causes of Allende’s failure in Chile, he argues, the belief in US involvement meant that
communist advocacy of the Chilean Way and the peaceful road to socialism has effectively been replaced by the historically more orthodox Marxist-Leninist view that the dictatorship of the proletariat must normally be achieved through armed struggle and violent revolution. (393)
By contrast, his account makes evident that Allende and the left in Chile lost the political center and with it any hope of success. It becomes clear that charting and executing a path to any significantly different political, social and especially economic future requires some level of majority support, as least passively, if one wishes to avoid a path of revolutionary violence, as Davis argues Allende did.
Although published in 1985, and exploring a period from just over a decade earlier, Davis’s essay provides startling commentary on the events of the last several years in the United States. With prophetic concern, Davis notes that
It has been a long time since North America has been subjected to such a rending of the social fabric as Chile experienced before and after 11 September 1973. I hope Americans would react differently, but I am not sure they would. (369)
Certainly, although our current moment in the US has little of the profound disruption that occurred in Chile over the period covered by Davis’s book, the “rending of the social fabric” that has been experienced here over the past decade or so would seem to confirm Davis’s doubts. His expectations for how citizens should instead react serves as a powerful reminder of what is lacking now:
The Declaration of Independence speaks of “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” Americans do care that divergent points of view should get a decent hearing. We must feel ashamed when rancor silences discourse. We must be concerned that public servants not be pilloried…. As the old saying has it, we must get about the task of raising our voices a little lower. (397)
One could, admittedly, argue that for every public servant unfairly pilloried, others have been all too willing to lead the charge of their constituents into a divisive partisan environment in which rancor silences nuanced discourse.
In The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende , Davis comes across as an ambassador of the old mold, a career diplomat with a deep understanding and respect for his position and work. For those familiar with only the claims that the CIA played an active role in overthrowing Allende, his book paints a clear and comprehensive picture of a country spiraling into chaos, needing no outside help to be tipped over the edge into a violent coup. Far from vilifying Allende, however, he acknowledges his respect for the former president of Chile, highlighting his virtues as well as his failures. His balanced presentation paints a believable counterpoint to the narrative of US overreach in Chile, however often such overreach may have taken place elsewhere.
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