On Liberty (1859)
John Stuart Mill (1806-1879)
128 pages
In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues for allowing people broad freedom of thought and action – as long as they do not thereby harm others. He begins by establishing the motivations for such a principle of individual liberty, describing the variety of benefits it provides to both personal and societal development. He then explores the political interests and social realities that too often end up limiting it – constraints that largely remain present today, almost two centuries later.
He opens by noting that “the struggle between Liberty and Authority [has been a] conspicuous feature in … history,” as peoples have sought “protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.” (5) Initially, this came in the form of limiting the span of dominion of absolute rulers; later came the implementation of representative governments ruling with the consent of the governed, generally through a periodic plebiscite. Mill concedes, however, that these changes have often simply resulted in a shift from the tyranny of a single ruler to a tyranny of the majority, enforced by “the will of [those] who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority.”
While political control has the benefit, at least, of visible regulations and laws, Mill argues that there also developed a “social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression … penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.” Together, these tyrannies – the political of laws and the social of customs – have continued to constrain human independence and so the ability to develop and flourish. (8-9)
society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. … society equalizes under all circumstances, and the victory of equality in the modern world is only the political and legal recognition of the fact that society has conquered the public realm. (40, Arendt)
It is precisely such imposed uniformity that Mill argues must be rejected, by allowing individuals broad latitude to act on their personal thoughts and opinions.
Noting that most would agree that limits should exist to the extent of political and social control over individuals, Mill explores the challenge of establishing a proper balance between control and human liberty. He proposes a fairly clear standard for defining this balance:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty or action of any of their number, is self-protection … to prevent harm to others. (14)
One should, he argues, be free to think and discuss and do what one wants, as long as it does not harm someone else. But the devil’s in the details, of course, no less today than when Mill wrote his essay: who gets to define the ‘I’m not hurting anyone’ line?
Before engaging on that point, however, Mill first lays out his arguments for the importance of permitting individual liberty. And he begins with what he acknowledges is the easier case – freedom of thought and speech.
Allowing these freedoms, he argues, enables discussions that foster a higher level of both personal and societal development. He explores in detail both the case of a particular individual’s contrarian (to established belief) opinion actually being true – in which case, by not allowing engagement with it a society loses the opportunity to correct its own error – and the case of an individual’s opinion being in fact erroneous – in which case, by not allowing engagement with it society misses out on the opportunity to maintain a clear understanding of the correctness of its current belief, simply leaving it as established dogma. As Mill notes:
it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. (24-25)
As critical as it is to human development, however, Mill acknowledges that freedom of discussion does not always succeed in correcting false ideas. He highlights social constraints, in particular, as invidious and restrictive, and as too often hardened into dogma; he complains of his age that “people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them.” (26-27) He particularly laments the social limitations on individuals that arise out of
the revival of religion [which] is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is the strong permanent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of people … it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution. (36)
Precisely such hardened beliefs, he finds, can fail to be changed by discussion.
I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbate thereby; the truth … being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. (58)
Nonetheless, he goes on to argue,
There is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. (58)
Having established the importance of freedom of thought and speech, Mill extends his reasoning to argue that “men should be free to act on their opinions … so long as it is at their own risk and peril.” (62) While allowing that freedom of action cannot be as broad as that of opinion, he nonetheless argues that overly limiting it stunts a person’s potential development; they become simple followers of established social doctrine.
I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. (68)
When Mill describes the origins of the excessive limitations on individuals he finds imposed by society, a certain elitism enters into his account. He laments the loss of an earlier aristocracy able to largely ignore the opinion of the masses, and that had led at one time in Europe to “remarkable diversity of character and culture.” (80) In his time, he argues,
public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of the masses … that is to say, collective mediocrity. … [they] do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves. (73)
And he finds the force of public opinion
peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality, [and with] the general average of mankind … not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations. (77)
Blaming this loss of individualism in Europe on the leveling impacts of expanding education, communication and commerce, Mill argues that
instead of [individuals with] great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will, its result is weak feelings and weak energies, which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength or reason. (77)
the man who demands more of himself than the rest,” as opposed to the masses “who demand nothing special of themselves, [and] for whom to live is to be every moment what they already are; … more buoys that float on the waves. (15, Ortega y Gasset)
Could one not argue, however, that the strong permanent … intolerance in the feelings of a people that leads them to attack those individuals who think and act outside social norms, can best hope to be addressed through expanded education, communication, and mobility, in the sense of exposing people to other norms? Not, certainly, that such opportunities always reduce intolerance, especially when social norms and constraints become enforced by the State through public education, as Mill describes later in his essay, in which he argues for the State requiring education of the young, yet against the State directing the content of such education. (117) But his implied solution of a return to aristocracy – in order to have people powerful enough to be in a position to actively explore their individuality in ways outside social norms, hardly feels comforting – especially as aristocracy tends to lead to domineering behavior that constrains individual liberty for the majority.
Though Mill repeatedly returns to his concern about religious dogmatism as the origin of much of societal intolerance to individual liberty, he does briefly identify a completely different source of the drive to conformity: the economic system. He notes that
There is now scarcely any outlet for energy … except business. The energy expended in this may … be … considerable. What little is left from that employment, is expended on some hobby; which may be a useful, even a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one thing, and generally a thing of small dimensions. (78)
The capitalist economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him … as an unalterable order of things in which he must live [and that] forces the individual to conform to capitalist rules of action. (54, Weber)
The ascent of economic power in society, then, completes the leveling of societies. While some distinctions may remain between peoples of different countries, as businesses have become global concerns, they have driven increasing commonality, in the name of optimizing efficiency. And, as Mill and Weber observe, this has further reduced the scope within which individuals can express themselves.
Shifting to address the question of the proper limits of individual liberty, Mill explores where the line may properly be drawn for deciding that an individual’s actions cause harm to another and so are to be constrained. He does this by considering a variety of cases, and while the conclusions he comes to for deciding these cases generally seem clear in intent, the reality of extrapolating them more broadly leads to distinctions more hazy and gray than clear and defined.
Thus, for example, he takes the case that
though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order. … a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and … spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. (85-6)
Although Mill rules out punishment – by which, one presumes, he refers to violence, fines, imprisonment – he describes a variety of natural, spontaneous consequences of reaction that could arise in response to a person’s behavior that one disagrees with.
These essentially come to it being acceptable to ostracize someone for their perceived “deficiencies.” (85) Mill has in mind here
a person who shows rashness, obstinance, self-conceit – who cannot live within moderate means – who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences – who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect, (86)
but these are indeed the obvious, easy cases. Though he elsewhere makes clear that he finds the society of his time – particularly the middle class – all too ready to condemn those who don’t follow their religious strictures, his elaboration here leaves a huge breach through which religionists can claim their right to punish a non-believer. For how easy it can come to find a non-believer as reflecting obstinacy, self-conceit, or to fail to restrain himself from hurtful indulgences. Mill’s argument very much seems to become one of, I’ll know it when I see it, in terms of identifying whether limitations placed on an individual for their behavior pass muster.
Setting aside such cases of people speaking and acting outside social norms, perhaps more challenging examples involve individuals acting in a way that affects others financially or physically, which Mill touches on only fleetingly. A simple, present-day example is someone who enjoys skiing (or some other sport); the risk of injury is real, and insurance companies spread that risk across their subscribers in the form of higher costs. One could imagine insurance costs dropping for everyone, if no one was allowed to participate in high-risk sports. But where would one draw the line for what is allowed?
A conceptually similar, but even more complex example involves addressing the climate change crisis. To what extent should a government be able to limit activities that contribute to worsening the crisis? Clearly, any one person’s activities will have an insignificant impact; millions, however, doing those same things certainly worsen the situation, and so invite regulatory constraints.
Mill seems to accept limitations as permissible in such situations, noting that if someone
has infringed the rule necessary for the protection of his fellow creatures, individually or collectively [the] evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. (88)
And, later,
For such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that one or the other is requisite for is protection. (104)
The reality, however, is that allowing such limitation on individual behavior still leaves the question of where to the draw the line. One approach could be that such constraints can only be, or at least can best be, defined through the democratic process – but both Mill’s own disparaging view of the overwhelming force of public opinion in politics and our own experiences in the present day don’t offer much confidence for relying on such a decision-making process.
Ultimately, however, Mill makes a powerful and persuasive case in On Liberty for the importance of individual liberty, for the benefit of both the individual themselves and society as a whole, whatever the challenges of determining what amount of political and social constraint makes sense. Instead of fearing opinions and actions of those who transgress established opinion (again, while not harming others in the process), we should celebrate their courage and service to society:
If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour for ourselves. (51)
Other notes and information:
This edition contains three other essays (Utilitarianism, Considerations on Representative Government, and The Subjection of Women) which I haven’t read yet.
Have you read this book, others by this author, or even similar ones by other authors? I’d enjoy hearing your thoughts.
Other of my book reviews: FICTION Bookshelf and NON-FICTION Bookshelf
